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Introduction
Many of our most consequential choices involve trad-
ing off an outcome’s magnitude against its timing.
Should we accept a job offer right after graduating
or invest in further education to earn more later?
Should we consume now or invest to enable more
consumption later? Do we socialize at the bar after
work or stay overtime to save for that dream vaca-
tion? The ubiquity and importance of such intertempo-
ral choices has spawned a rich literature (for reviews,
see Frederick et al. 2002, Read 2004, Urminsky and
Zauberman 2014). One key finding from this literature
is that humans are generally impatient, often prefer-
ring smaller earlier rewards to larger delayed ones,
even when waiting offers interest rates far in excess
of those typically available to consumers (e.g., Fred-
erick et al. 2002, Read et al. 2013, Olivola and Wang
2015). Impatience has been implicated in a wide range
of suboptimal behaviors (Reimers et al. 2009), such as
making insufficient provisions for retirement (Thaler
and Benartzi 2004), exercising too little (Chabris et al.
2008), smoking too much (Bickel et al. 1999), and
neglecting the damaging effects of current consump-
tion choices on the environment faced by future
generations (Hardisty and Weber 2009, Hardisty et al.
2012). Here, we propose a novel account of impatience
based on the attention given to the opportunity costs
of competing intertemporal choice options. Specifi-
cally, we argue that the opportunity costs of later con-
sumption are naturally more salient, or given greater
decision weight, than the opportunity costs of ear-
lier consumption. This biases choices toward smaller,
sooner rewards and away from larger, later ones. Con-
sequently, highlighting the (already salient) opportu-
nity costs of waiting longer does not affect patience,
but highlighting the less salient opportunity costs
of not waiting (as long) increases patience. We call
this the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hypoth-
esis. In this paper, we test the predictions of this
hypothesis and explore its generalizability through a
series of studies. In doing so, we also explain a puz-
zling phenomenon known as the “Hidden zero effect”
(Magen et al. 2008).
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Table 1 Key Terms and Abbreviations Along with Their Definitions
Term Definition
SS The smaller, sooner option in intertemporal choice. This option produces a smaller outcome, but does so sooner;
e.g., “Receive $100 today.”
LL The larger, later option. This option produces a larger outcome, but does so later; e.g., “Receive $150 in one year.”
SS opportunity cost The opportunity cost of choosing the SS option. This is the LL outcome that decision makers would forgo (at the time
when the LL outcome would occur) if they chose the SS option.
LL opportunity cost The opportunity cost of choosing the LL option. This is the SS outcome that decision makers would forgo (at the time
when the SS outcome would occur) if they chose the LL option.
SS zero/SS nothing frame Frame in which the SS option is described as offering zero (or nothing) at the time when the LL outcome would
occur; e.g., “Receive $100 today and $0 in one year,” or “Receive $100 today and nothing in one year.” In other
words, this frame only highlights the SS opportunity cost.
LL zero/LL nothing frame Frame in which the LL option is described as offering zero (or nothing) at the time when the SS outcome would
occur; e.g., “Receive $0 today and $150 in one year,” or “Receive nothing today and $150 in one year.” In other
words, this frame only highlights the LL opportunity cost.
Explicit zero/Explicit nothing frame Frame in which the SS option is described as offering zero (or nothing) at the time when the LL outcome would occur
and the LL option is described as offering zero (or nothing) at the time when the SS outcome would occur. In other
words, this frame highlights both the SS opportunity cost and the LL opportunity cost.
Hidden zero/Hidden nothing frame This is the standard frame that is typically used in intertemporal choice problems. This frame does not explicitly
mention the zero (or nothing) outcomes associated with each option. In other words, this frame highlights neither
the SS opportunity cost nor the LL opportunity cost.
ASOC effect The Asymmetric Subjective Opportunity Cost effect is the main implication of the asymmetric subjective opportunity
cost hypothesis. The empirical result is that frames in which the SS zero (or SS nothing) is included increase
patience, while frames in which the LL zero (or LL nothing) is included do not decrease (nor increase) patience.
Asymmetric Subjective Opportunity
Cost Neglect
In the language of economics, the term “opportunity
cost” is short for “you can’t have it all.” We have to
choose something, and what we do not choose is the
opportunity cost of what we do. More formally, the
opportunity cost of an option is the value of its best
alternative (where “value” incorporates all the conse-
quences of that alternative). If your two best options
(or your only options) are X and Y , and you can have
only one of them, then the opportunity cost of X is Y ,
and the opportunity cost of Y is X. In a prototypical
intertemporal choice, a smaller outcome that occurs
sooner (denoted SS) is pitted against a larger one that
occurs later (LL). In these two-option cases, the oppor-
tunity cost of SS is LL and the opportunity cost of LL
is SS. Rational decision makers will choose the option
with the lower opportunity cost: if the opportunity
cost of SS exceeds that of LL, they will be patient and
choose the larger but later option. (Table 1 explains
key abbreviations used throughout the paper.)
However, much research has shown that people
often neglect opportunity costs (Shafir and Thaler
2006), so that seemingly trivial or redundant re-
minders of opportunity costs can alter the perceived
attractiveness of options and push people toward
options that do not incur those costs (Frederick et al.
2009, Greenberg and Spiller 2016, Spiller 2011).1 For
1 The term “opportunity cost” is often used loosely to refer to any
alternative to a given option, and not necessarily, as it is defined
instance, simply prompting consumers with the obvi-
ous fact that buying the cheaper of two products will
leave them with “extra money” makes that cheaper
product more attractive and increases their likelihood
of purchasing it (Frederick et al. 2009). This observa-
tion led Frederick et al. (2009) to suggest that oppor-
tunity cost reminders have an asymmetric effect, in
that they shift preferences toward the cheaper option,
rather than the higher quality one. We interpret this as
follows: in a straight choice between options, the qual-
ity given up by taking the cheaper option is naturally
salient to consumers, but the money given up by tak-
ing the higher quality option is not. In a more recent
paper, Chatterjee et al. (2016) observed two asymme-
tries: for experiential goods, such as holidays, high-
lighting temporal opportunity costs (but not financial
opportunity costs) increases liking for the temporally
cheaper good, whereas for material goods, such as
computers, highlighting financial opportunity costs
(but not temporal ones) increases liking for the finan-
cially cheaper good.
We propose that the tendency to discount the future
stems in part from another asymmetry in opportunity
cost neglect. Specifically, while people are naturally
well aware of the opportunity costs of LL (forgoing an
earlier benefit), they pay less attention to the opportu-
nity costs of SS (forgoing a later benefit). This does not
mean they do not “know” that choosing SS will mean
in economics, to the best alternative. In a two-alternative forced
choice, however, the option forgone is the opportunity cost of the
option taken even by the strict economic definition.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
37
.20
5.2
02
.97
] o
n 2
5 A
pr
il 2
01
7, 
at 
04
:18
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Read, Olivola, and Hardisty: The Value of Nothing
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–22, © 2016 The Author(s) 3
Table 2 The Four Core Zero Frame Conditions and Their Opportunity Cost Implications
SS opportunity cost
Implicit Explicit
LL opportunity cost
Implicit
Hidden zero:
$100 today
OR
$150 in one year
SS zero:
$100 today and $0 in one year
OR
$150 in one year
Explicit
LL zero:
$100 today
OR
$0 today and $150 in one year
Explicit zero:
$100 today and $0 in one year
OR
$0 today and $150 in one year
they would not get LL—any more than they do not
“know” that buying the cheaper of two products will
leave them with money to spare—but rather that this
knowledge is underweighted in their decision making.
The opportunity cost of SS, therefore, plays a smaller
role in intertemporal decision making than the oppor-
tunity cost of LL.
This proposed asymmetry in intertemporal oppor-
tunity cost salience leads to the following predictions:
When the opportunity costs of LL are highlighted,
patience will be unaffected, since these costs are nat-
urally salient; but if the opportunity costs of SS
are highlighted, patience (or choices of LL) will be
increased. We tested these predictions by employ-
ing framing manipulations that subtly highlight the
opportunity costs of SS and/or LL in standard
intertemporal choice tasks.
These standard tasks involve choices between
smaller, sooner (SS) and larger, later (LL) payments
such as “$100 today OR $150 in one year.” Patience
is measured as the propensity to choose LL. In the
example just given, the opportunity cost of choos-
ing LL is that you will miss out on receiving $100
today, while the opportunity cost of choosing SS is
that you will miss out on receiving $150 in one year.
Magen et al. (2008) showed that providing a subtle
nudge that draws attention to both opportunity costs
made people more patient. They compared two ways
of framing intertemporal choices, which they termed
the “Hidden zero” and “Explicit zero” frames:
Hidden zero: $100 today OR $150 in one year;
Explicit zero: $100 today and $0 in one year OR $0
today and $150 in one year.
By emphasizing that each option will yield “$0”
at the time its alternative pays off, the Explicit zero
frame highlights the opportunity costs of both SS
and LL. Magen et al. (2008) found that patience was
increased by the Explicit zero frame—a phenomenon
they called the Hidden zero effect. Similar results
were earlier reported by Loewenstein and Prelec
(1991, 1993), and later replicated by Radu et al. (2011),
Wu and He (2012), Read and Scholten (2012), and
Magen et al. (2014).
One question raised by the Hidden zero effect
is why highlighting the opportunity costs of both
options increases patience, rather than leaving it
unchanged or even reducing it. One might have
expected the two explicit opportunity costs would
exert countervailing effects: Highlighting the oppor-
tunity cost of choosing SS through what we will call
the “SS zero” (the later zero added to the descrip-
tion of SS) would favor patience, whereas highlight-
ing the opportunity cost of choosing LL by including
the “LL zero” (the earlier zero added to the descrip-
tion of LL) would favor impatience. The Hidden zero
effect, in which highlighting both opportunity costs
increases patience, suggests the SS zero must have
more impact on patience than the LL zero. In fact,
based on our theoretical account, we hypothesize a
strong form of asymmetry such that the SS zero
should increase patience while the LL zero should
have no effect whatsoever on patience (not even a
weaker effect).
In the studies reported below, we test this hy-
pothesis by decomposing the Explicit zero frame
into two frames that isolate each opportunity cost
reminder:
SS zero frame: $100 today and $0 in one year OR
$150 in one year;
LL zero frame: $100 today OR $0 today and $150 in
one year.
The entire design is depicted in Table 2. We refer
to the four frames described above and in Table 2
(Hidden zero, Explicit zero, SS zero, LL zero) as the
core frames. In our studies, we find that the increased
patience in the Explicit zero condition is entirely due
to the SS zero. A similar finding was reported by Wu
and He (2012) in an East Asian sample,2 but we go
beyond this result to show it is robust to variations
2 We learned of Wu and He’s (2012) excellent paper only after we
had finished Studies 1–4 in this paper and completed a draft of this
manuscript. Although Wu and He (2012) first demonstrated what
we call the ASOC effect, this is not the focus of their paper (indeed,
only one of their studies contains an SS zero frame).
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in the magnitude, timing, sign, and nature of out-
comes, and also that it generalizes to different, but
theoretically equivalent, ways of highlighting the SS
zero. Moreover, we show it is associated with differ-
ences in choice times in a manner consistent with our
proposed theory: the SS zero substantially increases
choice time, whereas the LL zero has little or no effect.
This suggests the SS zero frame increases attention
paid to information that people may not naturally
consider, whereas the LL zero frame is already intu-
itively obvious and thus leads to no additional pro-
cessing of opportunity costs.
Study 1
In Study 1 we investigated the asymmetric subjec-
tive opportunity cost hypothesis by testing the core
frames described above along with one further frame.
The core frames provided a test of the proposed
asymmetry: highlighting the opportunity cost of SS
will increase patience (regardless of whether the LL
opportunity cost is also highlighted), but highlight-
ing the opportunity cost of LL will have no effect (in
either direction) on patience (regardless of whether
the SS opportunity cost is already highlighted). The
main empirical implication of the asymmetric sub-
jective opportunity cost hypothesis is what we will
label the ASOC (Asymmetric Subjective Opportunity
Cost) effect: relative to the Hidden zero frame (with
no opportunity costs explicit), the SS zero frame (with
the opportunity cost of choosing SS made explicit)
will increase choices of LL, but the LL zero frame
(with opportunity cost of choosing LL made explicit)
will not; moreover, patience in the Explicit zero frame
(which makes both opportunity costs explicit) will be
the same as that in the SS zero frame (since only
the SS zero has any effect). In summary, we began
with the following predictions over the ordering of LL
choice proportions across the four conditions:
SS zero = Explicit zero > Hidden zero = LL zero,
or
SS zero − Hidden zero>Hidden zero −LL zero.
The latter prediction is the heart of the asymmetric
subjective opportunity cost hypothesis and, as already
mentioned, we repeatedly find that while the differ-
ence on the left of the inequality is positive (i.e., SS
zero > Hidden zero), the difference on the right is
essentially zero (i.e., LL zero = Hidden zero).
One additional frame was included to test the
Magen et al. (2008) proposal that the Hidden zero
effect occurs because the Explicit zero frame turns LL
into an increasing sequence of payoffs (as in, “first
you receive $0, then you receive $150”) and SS
into a decreasing one (“first you receive $100, then
you receive $0”). Because researchers had already
reported that people prefer increasing over decreas-
ing sequences of earnings (e.g., Chapman 1996, 2000;
Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991; Read and Pow-
ell 2002), it follows that the Explicit zero frame
would produce more choices of the increasing LL
sequence relative to the decreasing SS one.3 Loewen-
stein and Prelec (1993) had previously tested this
idea with nonmonetary choices. Their respondents
chose between: “Dinner at [a fancy] French restau-
rant on Friday in one month” or “Dinner at [a fancy]
French restaurant on Friday in two months.” When
the options were presented this way, only 20% pre-
ferred to delay the French restaurant dinner. How-
ever, when both options were turned into temporal
sequences by adding a “zero” outcome (Decreasing
sequence: “Dinner at [a fancy] French restaurant on
Friday in one month and dinner at home on Friday in
two months;” Increasing sequence: “Dinner at home on
Friday in one month and dinner at [a fancy] French
restaurant on Friday in two months”), many more
preferred to delay the French dinner. Loewenstein
and Prelec (1993, p. 93) observed that “[b]ecause peo-
ple eat dinner at home on most nights anyway, the
mere embedding of the French dinner in an explicit
binary sequence [reminds the subject] that the choice
is ‘really’ between complete sequences.”
Radu et al. (2011) previously contributed evidence
against the sequence hypothesis by showing the Hid-
den zero effect extends backward in time, to past
outcomes. Here, we provided a more direct test of
the sequence hypothesis for future outcomes via a
“Middle zero” frame, which was like the Explicit zero
frame, but with the zeros occurring halfway (in time)
between the SS and LL outcomes:
Explicit zero: $100 today and $0 in one year OR $0
today and $150 in one year;
Middle zero: $100 today and $0 in six months OR
$0 in six months and $150 in one year.
The Middle zero frame forms increasing and de-
creasing sequences, just like the Explicit zero frame,
but because both options offer $0 in six months (rather
than today or in one year), it does so without draw-
ing attention to either opportunity cost. The sequence
hypothesis would predict greater patience in the Mid-
dle zero than in the Hidden zero frame and, more
generally, that the five conditions would be ordered
as follows (in terms of LL choice proportions):
Explicit zero = Middle zero > SS zero = LL zero >
Hidden zero.
That is, both the SS zero frame (which turns SS into
a decreasing sequence) and the LL zero frame (which
3 Some studies also find preferences for decreasing or constant mon-
etary sequences over increasing ones (e.g., Frederick and Loewen-
stein 2008, Gigliotti and Sopher 1997, Guyse et al. 2002, Manzini
et al. 2010).
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turns LL into an increasing sequence) would yield
greater patience than the Hidden zero frame. Such an
account would also predict that patience would be
greater when both zeros are present (as in the Explicit
zero and Middle zero frames), compared to when
only one is. The asymmetric subjective opportunity
cost hypothesis, on the other hand, does not differen-
tiate between the Hidden and Middle zero frames, but
does differentiate between the SS and LL zero frames,
and so predicts:
SS zero = Explicit zero > Hidden zero = Middle
zero = LL zero.
The Middle zero frame also permitted us to test
yet another explanation for the Hidden zero effect:
that making zero outcomes explicit increases the per-
ceived size of the nonzero outcomes by contrast (e.g.,
Bateman et al. 2007). Increasing the perceived sizes of
both nonzero outcomes, in this way, could produce a
magnitude effect—the well-known finding that peo-
ple are more patient when larger monetary amounts
are at stake (first reported by Thaler 1981, and repli-
cated extensively). This could produce two possi-
ble patterns of results, depending on whether the
numerical contrast generated by a zero applies to
both options (global numerical contrast) or only to
the option associated with that zero (local numerical
contrast: the SS zero makes the SS outcome appear
larger and the LL zero makes the LL outcome appear
larger):
Global numerical contrast: Explicit zero = Middle
zero ≥ SS zero = LL zero>Hidden zero;
Local numerical contrast: LL zero ≥ Explicit zero =
Middle zero>Hidden zero> SS zero.
Methods
Participants. Participants in this web-based study
were recruited through Maximiles (http://www
.maximiles.co.uk), an Internet service in which mem-
bers earn points by completing surveys (see Reimers
2009 for additional details), which they can then
exchange for prizes. Our sample consisted of 710
British residents (44% female; mean age = 46.7 years),
who participated in exchange for Maximiles points.
As with all studies in this paper, sample sizes were
chosen to provide sufficient power to detect what we
anticipated would be a modest effect size (as seems
typical for this type of framing manipulation). There-
fore, we always recruited at least 60 participants per
between-subjects cell, which gave us 80% power to
detect main effects of d = 0036 or larger in our 2 × 2
designs (i.e., the four “core” frames tested throughout
this paper).
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to
one of the four core frames, or to the Middle zero
frame. They made 15 hypothetical choices between
Table 3 Delay Lengths and Payoff Magnitudes for the 15 Items Drawn
From Magen et al. (2008) (the “Magen Items”), and the
27 Items Drawn From Kirby et al. (1999) (the “Kirby Items”)
Smaller, sooner (SS) Larger, later (LL) Middle zero
Amount Amount Delay (days) Delay (days) Subsets
Magen et al. (2008) items (the “Magen items”)
£2.00 £8.50 18 9
£3.10 £8.50 7 4
£3.30 £8.00 14 7
£4.10 £7.50 20 10 ∗
£4.30 £7.50 22 11 ∗
£4.50 £7.70 28 14 ∗
£4.70 £5.40 92 46 ∗
£4.90 £5.80 42 21 ∗
£5.00 £7.20 34 17 ∗
£5.40 £8.00 30 15 ∗
£5.50 £7.50 61 31 ∗
£6.00 £8.50 46 23 ∗
£6.70 £7.50 119 60 ∗
£6.90 £8.70 102 51 ∗
£8.00 £8.40 140 70
Kirby et al. (1999) items (the “Kirby items”)
$11 $30 7
$14 $25 19 ∗
$15 $35 13
$19 $25 53 ∗
$20 $55 7
$22 $25 136
$24 $35 29 ∗
$25 $30 80
$25 $60 14
$27 $50 21 ∗
$28 $30 179
$31 $85 7
$33 $80 14
$34 $35 186
$34 $50 30 ∗
$40 $55 62
$41 $75 20
$47 $50 160
$49 $60 89 ∗
$54 $55 117
$54 $60 111
$54 $80 30
$55 $75 61
$67 $75 119 ∗
$69 $85 91
$78 $80 162
$80 $85 157
Notes. Payments were in £ for UK studies and $ for U.S. studies. Items iden-
tified with an asterisk in the rightmost column were used in selected studies.
smaller, sooner (SS) payments available today, and
larger, later (LL) ones, with each pair of options pre-
sented in the assigned frame. These choice items,
shown in the top half of Table 3, were identical to
those tested by Magen et al. (2008), except with pay-
offs in sterling (£). As Table 3 shows, these items are
characterized by small payments (ranging from £2 to
£8.70), and the fact that the SS option is available
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
37
.20
5.2
02
.97
] o
n 2
5 A
pr
il 2
01
7, 
at 
04
:18
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Read, Olivola, and Hardisty: The Value of Nothing
6 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–22, © 2016 The Author(s)
Figure 1 (Color online) Example Screen Shot From Study 1, Showing the Vertical (Top) and Horizontal (Bottom) Presentations of Choice Questions
in the Explicit Zero Framing Condition
“today” (i.e., never delayed). From here on, we refer
to these choice items as the “Magen” items.
The choice items were presented individually (i.e.,
one pair of options at a time), and their ordering was
randomized for each person. Options were presented
vertically (as Magen et al. had done; see the top part
of Figure 1) for half the respondents, and horizontally
(with SS appearing to the left of LL; see the bottom
part of Figure 1) for the other half. This allowed us
to test whether the Hidden zero effect was due to the
visual alignment of payoffs across time in the Explicit
zero (but not the Hidden zero) frame.
In all conditions, our measure of patience (the
dependent variable) was the proportion of LL choices.
Results
Patience was unaffected by whether options were pre-
sented vertically or horizontally. This was confirmed
by a 5 (zero frame) by 2 (presentation format: verti-
cal versus horizontal) ANOVA, which revealed nei-
ther a main effect of format 4F 4117005 = 00215, nor
a frame by format interaction 4F 4417005 = 00635. The
main effect of zero frame was, however, highly sig-
nificant, F 4417005 = 9074, p < 000001, 2p = 0005. We,
therefore, collapsed across presentation format (ver-
tical versus horizontal) and focused our analyses on
the zero frames.
First, we examined the Middle zero frame: Patience
was virtually identical across the Middle zero and
Hidden zero frames (51% versus 52% LL choices,
t < 0027). This rules out the sequence-preference and
numerical contrast explanations, which both predict
greater patience in the Middle zero frame, but not
the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hypothe-
sis, which does not predict a Middle zero effect.
Next, as depicted in Figure 2, we compared pa-
tience in the four core frames. We obtained the orig-
inal finding of much greater patience in the Explicit
zero than the Hidden zero frame (65% versus 52%
LL choices, t42825= 4031, p < 000001, d = 0051). Consis-
tent with the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost
hypothesis, however, this was entirely attributable
to the SS zero. As predicted, patience did not dif-
fer between the SS and Explicit zero frames, both of
which yielded greater patience than the LL and Hid-
den zero frames (which did not differ). A 2 (LL zero:
present versus absent) by 2 (SS zero: present ver-
sus absent) ANOVA confirmed the main effect of SS
zero (F 4115615= 30065, p < 000001, 2p = 0005), whereas
there was no effect of LL zero nor an interaction (both
ps> 002).
Figure 2 Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL Choices), as a
Function of Zero Framing, in Study 1
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Notes. The horizontal axis indicates the presence or absence of the SS zero;
the solid line indicates the presence of the LL zero and the dotted line indi-
cates its absence. Error bars represent +/− 1 SE.
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Discussion
The results of Study 1 support the asymmetric sub-
jective opportunity cost hypothesis. Relative to the
standard Hidden zero condition, patience increases
when options are framed to highlight how choos-
ing SS entails forgoing a later reward, but it is
unchanged when the frame highlights how choos-
ing LL entails forgoing an earlier reward. In addition,
our results ruled out the two alternative explana-
tions for the “Hidden zero” effect that we discussed
above: sequence-preference (Loewenstein and Prelec
1993, Magen et al. 2008; see also Radu et al. 2011)
and numerical contrast (Bateman et al. 2007). Finally,
the results ruled out two additional explanations that
were later brought to our attention: “averaging,” and
“similarity.” The “averaging” account (e.g., Anderson
1974, Troutman and Shanteau 1976) suggests that a
choice option may be evaluated as the average of its
components, and therefore that adding a “zero” to an
option with positive payoffs makes it less attractive.
This account would not predict the absence of an LL
zero effect (contrary to what we found). Furthermore,
an “asymmetric averaging” account (whereby averag-
ing is only applied to the SS option) would not predict
a null effect in the Middle zero condition (contrary
to what we found). The “similarity” account suggests
that adding zeros to both options makes them appear
more similar, which might increase random respond-
ing (Franco-Watkins et al. 2006, 2010). However, simi-
larity would predict that the proportion of LL choices
would be closer to 50% in the Explicit zero condition,
yet we observed the opposite (see Figure 1). Further-
more, similarity would not predict a null effect in the
Middle zero condition (contrary to what we found).
Studies 2–5
In Studies 2–5 we investigated the generalizability of
the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hypothe-
sis by changing the sizes (Study 2) or signs (Study 4)
of the payoffs, by adding delays (Study 3), and by
using an alternative wording to highlight the oppor-
tunity costs (Study 5). The choice items presented in
Studies 2–5 were subsets of the 42 depicted in Table 3.
In Study 2, we used the 27 choice items devised by
Kirby et al. (1999), and which have been widely used
in studies of delay-discounting (e.g., Chabris et al.
2008, Luo et al. 2011, Myerson et al. 2014, Scholten
et al. 2014, Torres et al. 2013). These “Kirby” items
(presented in the bottom half of Table 3) involve
larger payoffs than the “Magen” items (top half
of Table 3) and were originally developed to test
the magnitude effect—the tendency for patience to
increase as both the SS and LL payoffs are increased
by a common multiplicative constant. The Kirby items
are known to be reliable and to have high external
validity (Myerson et al. 2014).
Studies 3—5 used subsets of the Magen and/or
Kirby items (items identified with an asterisk in the
rightmost column of Table 3). The “Magen subset”
comprised the 11 items from the original Magen items
that showed a strong Explicit zero effect (but not nec-
essarily the strongest ASOC effect) in Study 1. This
was mainly done to avoid using items that yielded
a clear ceiling or floor effect (i.e., items for which
almost everyone chose the SS option or the LL option,
across all frames). The “Kirby subset” comprised seven
Kirby items chosen from among those that showed
the strongest Explicit zero effect in Study 2.4 Partici-
pants in Study 3 completed the 11-item Magen sub-
set, while those in Study 4 completed the seven-item
Kirby subset. Participants in Study 5 were presented
with both subsets together (i.e., a total of 18 items).
As in Study 1, our main dependent variable was
the proportion of “patient” (LL) choices. In these stud-
ies (and all future studies we report), we specifically
recruited individuals who had not previously partici-
pated in any of our zero-framing studies.
Study 2
Study 2 tested the generality of the ASOC effect using
the Kirby items, which also allowed us to investigate
whether the effect is moderated by outcome magni-
tude. One possibility, for instance, is that when small
payoff amounts are on the table, the effect is par-
ticularly prominent because it is a relatively trivial
matter to ignore the SS opportunity cost, but as out-
come magnitude increases, the SS opportunity cost
becomes increasingly salient. In this case, payoff size
would moderate the ASOC effect. Alternatively, the
effect might be robust to variations in payoff size.
The Kirby items form nine sets of three choices
(triplets) in which the SS outcome is transformed into
the LL one by a common linear growth rate, ranging
from 0.016% to 25% per day. One SS outcome in one
triplet is relatively small (ranging from £25 to £35),
one is medium (£50 to £60), and one is large (£75
to £85). Within each triplet, the delays are approxi-
mately the same. For example, the following triplet
has a growth rate of 0.25% per day:
Small: £25 today OR £30 in 80 days;
Medium: £49 today OR £60 in 89 days;
Large: £69 today OR £85 in 91 days.
4 In Study 1, the 11 items in the Magen subset showed a Hidden
zero effect (difference in choice proportions between the Explicit
and Hidden zero frames) ranging from 13% to 26%. The remaining
four Magen items showed a difference of 5% or less. In Study 2,
13 of the 27 Kirby items showed a Hidden zero effect of 15% or
greater, and we chose seven of these items at random, for an aver-
age effect of 21%. When selecting items for both of these subsets, we
did not consider the magnitude of their SS zero effect (i.e., we only
selected them based on the magnitude of their Hidden zero effect).
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Table 4 Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL Choices), as a
Function of Framing Condition and Payoff Magnitude
Category in Study 2
Payoff magnitudes
Zero frame Small Medium Large Average N
Explicit zero 54% 59% 62% 58% 68
SS zero 54% 59% 60% 58% 64
LL zero 39% 46% 47% 44% 66
Hidden zero 38% 41% 46% 42% 64
Average [total] 46% 51% 54% 51% [262]
Kirby et al. (1999) 35% 41% 46% 41% 60
The magnitude effect predicts that, within each trip-
let, patience will increase with outcome magnitude.
Participants were 262 British residents recruited via
Maximiles and paid in points (57% female; mean
age = 45.3 years).
Results. We conducted a 2 (SS zero: present ver-
sus absent) by 2 (LL zero: present versus absent) by 3
(payoff magnitude: small, medium, or large) mixed
factorial ANOVA, where magnitude was the within-
participant factor. Table 4 displays the mean patience
for each framing condition and magnitude category.
There was a strong magnitude effect, with more
patience for larger outcomes, F 4215165 = 63013, p <
000001, 2p = 0020. Paired-sample t-tests revealed that
patience was greater for medium than small magni-
tudes, t42615 = 7061, p < 000001, d = 0047; and greater
for large than medium magnitudes, t42615= 3061, p <
000005, d = 0022. Table 4 also shows the equivalent
means (proportion of LL choices for each magnitude
category) from the control group in Kirby et al. (1999,
see their Table 4), illustrating how close the results in
their study were to those in our Hidden zero condi-
tion.
We also obtained the ASOC effect: a main effect
of SS zero, F 4112585 = 31054, p < 000001, 2p = 0.11,
but no effect of LL zero (F 4112585 = 0030). The three-
way interaction between payoff magnitude, SS zero,
and LL zero, was marginally significant (F 4215165 =
2078, p = 0006, 2p = 0001), but no other interactions
approached significance (all ps > 002). We conducted
separate 2 (SS zero) by 2 (LL zero) ANOVAs for each
payoff magnitude level and obtained a robust main
effect of SS zero in all three cases:
Small: F 4112585= 31073, p < 000001, 2p = 0011;
Medium: F 4112585= 31097, p < 000001, 2p = 0011;
Large: F 4112585= 23090, p < 000001, 2p = 0008.
Moreover, at no magnitude level was there a signif-
icant effect of LL zero nor an SS-by-LL interaction (all
ps> 003). Overall, these results provided another clear
demonstration of the ASOC effect, while also showing
that it holds over a range of outcome magnitudes.
Study 3
In Studies 1 and 2, the SS option was always available
immediately (i.e., today). Such immediate availability
has a special status in theories of intertemporal choice,
which often incorporate a “present bias” (e.g., Ainslie
1975, Böhm-Bawerk 1890, Laibson 1997, Olivola and
Wang 2015), or a disproportionate weighting of
present outcomes relative to delayed ones.
In Study 3 we investigated whether the ASOC ef-
fect also shows a present bias, in that the oppor-
tunity cost of LL is chronically salient only when
the SS outcome is available immediately. If so, then
if SS is delayed, the information contained in the LL
zero will cease to be redundant, and it will exert
its own effect—specifically, decreasing patience. We
will call this the present-biased asymmetric subjective
opportunity cost hypothesis. This hypothesis fits with
the Radu et al. (2011) discussion of the Hidden zero
effect, which they conceptualize as resulting from the
Explicit zero frame shifting attention away specifically
from the present.
An alternative hypothesis is based on the view
that what we call “present bias” is really an “earli-
est option” bias, even when that earliest option is not
available immediately (Scholten and Read 2006; see
also Read 2001, Masatlioglu and Ok 2007). Kable and
Glimcher (2010) referred to this as the “as soon as
possible” or “ASAP” effect. The key idea is that when
evaluating options, people disregard the common
delay to SS and LL, and consider only the interval
separating SS and LL. In contrast to the present-bias
asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hypothesis,
the “ASAP” asymmetric subjective opportunity cost
hypothesis predicts the same pattern of preferences
whether SS is available today or is delayed.
We compared the four core zero framing conditions,
both when SS is available today (Today-SS frames)
and when it is delayed (Delayed-SS frames). For the
Delayed-SS frames we maintained the time interval
between outcomes by adding a constant additional
delay to both SS and LL. The ASAP asymmetric sub-
jective opportunity cost hypothesis predicts the stan-
dard pattern of preferences for both the Today-SS and
Delayed-SS frames:
SS zero = Explicit zero > Hidden zero = LL zero
[as observed in Studies 1 and 2].
The present-biased asymmetric subjective opportu-
nity cost hypothesis, however, predicts the standard
pattern for Today-SS (just as in Studies 1 and 2), but
predicts the following pattern for Delayed-SS:
Delayed-SS: SS zero > Explicit zero Ò Hidden
zero> LL zero.
The present-biased asymmetric subjective oppor-
tunity cost hypothesis does not predict a specific
relationship between the Explicit and Hidden zero
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conditions, because the two zeros would influence
choice in opposite directions.
Methods. A new sample of 281 British residents
(58% female; mean age = 46.6 years) was recruited
through Maximiles and paid in points. Respondents
were randomly assigned to one of the four core
frames.
We created a Delayed-SS version of each choice
item in the 11-item Magen subset by adding the origi-
nal LL delay to both the sooner and later options. For
example,
Today-SS: £5.50 today OR £7.50 in 61 days;
became,
Delayed-SS: £5.50 in 61 days OR £7.50 in 122 days.
Thus, we produced a set of 22 choice items, com-
prising 11 Today-SS and 11 Delayed-SS items, which
we presented as a single block of items (randomly
ordered).
Results. As Figure 3 shows, the SS zero effect
was fully replicated for both Delayed-SS and Today-
SS conditions. We computed patience separately for
the Delayed-SS and Today-SS conditions and con-
ducted a 2 (SS zero) by 2 (LL zero) by 2 (SS tim-
ing: Today versus Delayed) mixed factorial ANOVA,
with SS timing as the repeated measure. The ANOVA
revealed main effects of SS timing and SS zero (and
an interaction between LL zero and SS timing), but
no interaction between SS zero and SS timing (nor
a main effect of LL zero, nor an SS-by-LL interac-
tion). The effect of SS timing was that patience was
greater when SS was available today than when it
Figure 3 (Color online) Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of
LL Choices), as a Function of Zero Framing, for the
Today-SS (Red Lines) and Delayed-SS (Blue Lines)
Conditions, in Study 3
SS zero absent SS zero present
Today-SS
Delayed-SS
30
40
50
60
70
80
LL zero present
LL zero absent
Pa
tie
nc
e 
(pr
op
ort
ion
 of
 LL
 
ch
oi
ce
s) 
(%
)
Note. Error bars represent +/− 1 SE.
was delayed5 (57% versus 52%), F 4112775 = 19032,
p < 000001, 2p = 0007. The effect of SS zero was as pre-
dicted: Average patience was much higher when the
SS zero was explicit than when it was not (69% ver-
sus 41%), F 4112775 = 57010, p < 000001, 2p = 0017. In
short, these results support the “as soon as possible”
version of the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost
hypothesis.
Study 4
In Studies 1–3, we focused on intertemporal choices
between gains. In Study 4, we investigated how zero
framing influences choices for losses. There are well-
established and robust differences between intertem-
poral choices for losses and gains, the most prominent
being that people are more patient when choosing
among losses (the “sign effect,” Thaler 1981).
Expressing patience in losses versus gains entails
different choices. To illustrate, consider an intertem-
poral choice between gains, as presented in the
Explicit zero frame:
SS: Receive £10 today and £0 in one year;
LL: Receive £0 today and £20 in one year.
Greater patience means more choices of LL. Now
imagine these payoffs are reflected into the loss
domain, with the same Explicit zero frame:
SS: Pay £10 today and £0 in one year;
LL: Pay £0 today and £20 in one year.
Now, greater patience will entail choices of SS: a pre-
ference to pay less sooner rather than more later.
A more patient decision maker, therefore, will be
more likely to choose LL for gains, and SS for losses.
The asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hy-
pothesis is that people become more patient when
reminded that choosing SS means forgoing a larger
but later reward, but not when reminded that choos-
ing LL means forgoing a smaller but sooner reward.
A similar logic can be applied to losses. Adding a zero
to the LL (i.e., impatient) option does not decrease
patience because the information conveyed by the
LL zero is redundant (people are naturally well aware
that choosing the later loss means they won’t have to
suffer the sooner loss). By contrast, the SS zero focuses
attention on the relatively underappreciated fact that
choosing SS means not having to pay more later.
Making the SS zero explicit should, therefore, lead to
greater patience both for gains and losses, meaning
more choices of LL for gains and SS for losses.
An alternative hypothesis suggested by Hardisty
et al. (2013) is a variant of the “as soon as possible”
5 This result is inconsistent with the conventional wisdom that
adding a front-end delay increases patience. In fact, the evidence
concerning this effect is mixed and our results are not unusual (see
data and discussion in Andreoni and Sprenger 2012, Read et al.
2012, and Sayman and Öncüler 2009).
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hypothesis discussed in Study 3. Hardisty et al. argued
that people want to expedite both gains and losses.
Since expediting a gain entails what we call “impa-
tience,” and expediting a loss entails “patience,” this
produces the sign effect. The corresponding interpre-
tation of the SS zero effect would be that it dis-
rupts this impulse, and so pushes people to favor
more delayed options (gains or losses). In contrast to
the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hypothe-
sis, this alternative account would predict opposing
effects of the SS zero on patience for losses and gains
because choosing the more delayed option reflects
greater patience for gains but greater impatience for
losses.
Methods. A new sample of 326 British residents
(52% female; mean age = 47.3 years) was recruited
through Maximiles (and paid in points).
Each participant was presented with numerically
identical choice items twice: both as gains (receiving
a payment) and as losses (paying a bill). The loss and
gain items were presented in separate blocks, with
block order counterbalanced across participants.
Results. Figure 4 presents the average level of
patience in each condition. As explained above, while
patience for gains was the proportion of LL choices,
patience for losses was the proportion of SS choices.
We conducted a 2 (LL zero) by 2 (SS zero) by 2 (pay-
off sign: gains versus losses) mixed factorial ANOVA,
where payoff sign was the repeated measure. The
ANOVA revealed a main effect of sign, F 4113225 =
56040, p < 000001, 2p = 0015, showing the expected
effect of greater patience for losses (84% SS choices)
than gains (68% LL choices).
Figure 4 (Color online) Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL
Choices), as a Function of Zero Framing, for Monetary
Gains (Blue Lines) and Monetary Losses (Red Lines), in
Study 4
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Note. Error bars represent +/− 1 SE.
There was also an ASOC effect for both gains and
losses. This was reflected in a main effect of SS zero,
F 4113225 = 24067, p < 000001, 2p = 0007. Although
there was a marginally significant interaction between
payoff sign and SS zero (F 4113225 = 3006, p = 00081,
2p = 0001), when we examined the simple effects
(i.e., separately analyzing loss and gain trials) we
found only a main effect of SS zero for both gains
(F 4113225 = 20015, p < 000001, 2p = 0006) and losses
(F 4113225 = 7038, p < 00007, 2p = 0002). The main ef-
fects of LL zero and the SS × LL interactions never
reached significance (all ps ≥ 0012).
Study 5
With the exception of Loewenstein and Prelec (1993),
all previous studies (including those reported above)
that demonstrated the effect(s) of making intertem-
poral opportunity costs explicit via a subtle framing
manipulation (Magen et al. 2008, 2014; Radu et al.
2011; Read and Scholten 2012; Wu and He 2012) did
so by reminding people that they would receive a
“0” payoff now (if they chose LL) or later (if they
chose SS). Therefore, one might be concerned that
these effects are due specifically to the presence of
the number zero. To rule out the possibility that this
is literally an asymmetric zero effect—as opposed to
an asymmetric opportunity cost effect—we conducted
a study in which the term “nothing” was substituted
for the £0.
Study 5 also provided additional tests of the “aver-
aging” and “numerical contrast” accounts considered
in Study 1. Arguably, any effect involving the mathe-
matical averaging or contrasting of attributes should
be stronger if those attributes are formatted in the
same way (e.g., “£25” and “£0”) rather than differ-
ently (“£25” and “nothing”). Therefore, the “aver-
aging” and “contrast” accounts suggest the effect
of highlighting the SS opportunity cost should be
weaker in the “nothing” condition.
Methods. We recruited 341 British residents from
Maximiles (N = 341; 48% female; mean age = 47.7
years), who were paid in points. Two participants
were excluded because they failed to answer any of
the choice items, leaving a final sample of 339.
The procedures were the same as in previous stud-
ies, except that we substituted “nothing” for the zero
(“£0”), so that examples of the four core frames used
in this study were as follows:
Hidden nothing: Receive £25 today OR Receive
£35 in 29 days;
LL nothing: Receive £25 today OR Receive nothing
today and £35 in 29 days;
SS nothing: Receive £25 today and nothing in
29 days OR Receive £35 in 29 days;
Explicit nothing: Receive £25 today and nothing in
29 days OR Receive nothing today and £35 in 29 days.
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Figure 5 Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL Choices), as a
Function of “Nothing” Framing, in Study 5
SS nothing absent SS nothing present
30
40
50
60
70
LL nothing present
LL nothing absent
Pa
tie
nc
e 
(pr
op
ort
ion
 of
 LL
 
ch
oi
ce
s) 
(%
)
Note. Error bars represent +/− 1 SE.
Results. Figure 5 displays results for all conditions.
As in the “zero” studies, patience was increased by the
SS nothing, but not by the LL nothing. A 2 (SS nothing:
present versus absent) by 2 (LL nothing: present ver-
sus absent) ANOVA confirmed a main effect of mak-
ing the SS nothing explicit, F 4113335= 38036, p < 00001,
2p = 0010, and revealed no other significant effects
(both ps > 0020). Therefore, the ASOC effect does not
depend (specifically) on the presence of the number
zero. Furthermore, the results of this study do not
support the “averaging” or “contrast” accounts, since
replacing “£0” with “nothing” does not weaken the
effect.
Study 6
In Study 6 we replicated the core conditions, using an
incentive compatible procedure in which participants
received payments based on the choices they made
(e.g., Cubitt et al. 1998). Magen et al. (2008) had also
tested the Hidden zero effect with real payments and
while it survived the test, it did so with a substantially
lower effect size. This makes it important to replicate
the ASOC effect with “real” choices.
An additional measure elicited in Study 6 (and the
two studies that follow it) was choice time (i.e., the
time spent deliberating and choosing). Choice time
is frequently used to gain additional insight into the
decision-making process (Billings and Scherer 1988,
Rubinstein 2013). According to the asymmetric sub-
jective opportunity cost hypothesis, when the SS zero
is made explicit, people will be alerted to a con-
sideration they would otherwise neglect. Since such
additional thinking should take time, we anticipated
longer choice times in the presence of the SS zero.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 301 Stanford Uni-
versity students (61% female; mean age = 21.3 years)
recruited with the understanding they would be paid
with an Amazon gift certificate, the value of which
would depend on their choices.
Procedure. To remind participants their choices
had real monetary consequences, we asked them to
provide their email addresses after they read the fol-
lowing instructions:
The 15 questions on the following pages involve
choices between amounts of money you could receive
at different times. We will randomly select one of
your choices and pay you the amount indicated by
your choice, at the time indicated by your choice. In
all cases, you will be paid in the form of an Ama-
zon gift certificate, which will be delivered to you via
email. Please enter the email address here at which you
would like to receive your payment.
All payments, even those made on the day of
the experiment, were delivered by email to ensure
there were no differences in transaction costs between
immediate and delayed payments (see Andreoni and
Sprenger 2012). An explanation of this procedure was
also included on the consent form.
As in Study 1, participants were presented with
all 15 Magen choice items (Table 3, top half). They
were assigned to one of the four core zero frames,
and choice time was measured as the time between
when the options appeared on the screen and when
participants submitted their choice.
Each participant was paid according to a random
choice mechanism: One of the 15 choice pairs was
selected at random, and the option chosen for that
pair was paid out with an Amazon.com gift certifi-
cate for that amount available on the chosen date.
For example, if the randomly selected choice pair was
“$5.50 today OR $7.50 in 61 days,” and the partici-
pant had chosen “$5.50 today,” then an Amazon gift
certificate for $5.50 was immediately emailed to her.
If, instead, she had chosen “$7.50 in 61 days” a cer-
tificate for $7.50 was automatically sent by Amazon
61 days later.
Results
Choices. Figure 6 presents mean patience in each
condition. These show the ASOC effect, with patience
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Figure 6 Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL Choices), as a
Function of Zero Framing, in Study 6
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Note. Error bars represent +/− 1 SE.
increased by the SS zero, but not by the LL zero.
A 2 (SS zero: present versus absent) by 2 (LL zero:
present versus absent) ANOVA confirmed a main
effect of making the SS zero explicit, F 4112965= 9021,
p = 00003, 2p = 0003, and no other significant effects
(both ps> 0019).
Table 5 compares the mean patience levels in Stud-
ies 1 and 6 with those obtained by Magen et al.
(2008) for hypothetical versus real choices. Although
the Hidden zero and SS zero effects were reduced
when choices involved real money, both remained
highly significant. The effect size (2p5 was reduced
from 0.05 in Study 1 to 0.03 in Study 6—although it
should be emphasized that the two studies differed in
other ways, including the country in which they were
administered and the nature of the sample (members
of the public in Study 1; students in Study 6).
Table 5 Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL Choices) for
Hypothetical and Incentive-Compatible Choices, as a
Function of Zero Framing Condition, in Studies 1 and 6,
and in Magen et al. (2008)
Experiment
Hypothetical Incentive compatible
Zero frame Study 1 Magen et al. Study 6 Magen et al.
Explicit zero 64% 59% 66% 71%
SS zero 61% 63%
LL zero 47% 55%
Hidden zero 50% 38% 56% 59%
Hidden zero effect 14% 21% 10% 12%
(Explicit minus Hidden):
SS zero effect : 14% 8%
(SS minus LL)
Choice times. Choice times were right-skewed, so
we log-transformed them prior to analysis and aver-
aged them across all 15 items for each participant. To
provide interpretable descriptive statistics, we expo-
nentiated the mean logs to get geometric means in
standard time units.
Consistent with the view that only the SS zero in-
creased consideration of (otherwise neglected) infor-
mation, choices took significantly longer when the
SS zero was explicit. It took an average of 3.8 seconds
to choose in the Hidden zero frame and 4.2 seconds
in the LL zero frame, compared to 4.8 seconds in the
SS zero frame and 5.0 seconds in the Explicit zero frame.
A 2×2 ANOVA, with average log-transformed choice
time as the dependent variable, revealed a main effect
of SS zero, F 4112975 = 4209, p < 00001, 2p = 0013, as
well as an effect of LL zero, F 4112975= 3409, p= 0003,
2p = 0002, but no interaction, F 4112975= 006. Note that
the effect size was much larger for the SS zero than
for the LL zero (2p = 0013 versus 2p = 0002, respec-
tively). The small effect of LL zero on choice times
likely occurred because merely adding zeros length-
ens the written description of the choice options and
thus gave participants a little more to read. The differ-
ence in choice times between the SS zero and LL zero
conditions, therefore, measures the relative increase
in decision deliberation due to the presence of the
SS zero while holding reading time relatively con-
stant (since both the SS and LL zeros contribute simi-
larly to word length). This paired contrast shows that
choice times were 0.6 seconds longer in the SS zero
frame than in the LL zero frame, t41505= 300, p < 0001,
d = 005.
In summary, the SS zero leads people to spend
more time deliberating, while the LL zero has only
a negligible effect on deliberation time. This is con-
sistent with our theory that the SS zero highlights
information people were not previously attending to,
while the LL zero highlights information that is natu-
rally obvious to them (so that making it explicit has
no effect on their deliberation process).
In our final two studies (Studies 7 and 8) we go
beyond the “zero” and “nothing” frames and con-
ceptually extend the idea of asymmetric attention to
opportunity costs. In particular, we show that the pre-
dictions of the asymmetric subjective opportunity cost
hypothesis hold when we use a completely different
method for highlighting opportunity costs (Study 7),
as well as for more naturalistic decision scenarios and
nonmonetary outcomes (Study 8).
Study 7
So far, we have tested the asymmetric subjective op-
portunity cost hypothesis by providing people with
subtle framing “nudges” (adding “£0” or “nothing”
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to the choice options). The hypothesis, however, gen-
eralizes to other ways of making opportunity costs
explicit. In Study 7 we provided even clearer opportu-
nity cost reminders: entire separate sentences, appear-
ing below the choice options, that explicitly reminded
participants what they would be giving up with
each choice option (e.g., “Remember: If you choose
$100 today, you will receive nothing in one year”).
We predicted these explicit reminders would have
effects analogous to the more implicit ones, so that
patience in the four conditions would be ordered as
follows:
SS reminder = Explicit reminder > LL reminder =
Hidden (or “No”) reminder.
Method
Participants. We recruited two new samples of Brit-
ish residents: one from Maximiles (N = 339; 48% female;
mean age = 48.5 years) and a second from Prolific Aca-
demic (http://www.prolific.ac; N = 397; 55% female;
mean age = 30.2 years). Maximiles respondents were
paid in points, while Prolific Academic respondents
were paid £0.80. We excluded five respondents (four
from Maximiles and one from Prolific Academic) who
answered none of the choice items. Our final sample
thus consisted of 731 participants.
Procedure. For choices, we used the Magen and
Kirby subsets in Table 3 (i.e., 18 choice items in total).
The choice options themselves were always presented
in the standard Hidden zero frame but, depending
on the condition, were accompanied by a “reminder”
that mapped onto the four core frames. This reminder
appeared below the choice options, in bold red letters
(see Figure 7) for the three non-Hidden conditions. To
illustrate, consider the choice: “£4.10 today OR £7.50
in 20 days.” The three possible reminders were as fol-
lows:
SS reminder: “Remember: If you choose £4.10
today, you will receive nothing in 20 days.”
LL reminder: “Remember: If you choose £7.50 in
20 days, you will receive nothing today.”
Explicit reminder: “Remember: If you choose £4.10
today, you will receive nothing in 20 days and if
Figure 7 (Color online) Screen Shot Showing the Explicit (Dual)
Reminder Condition in Study 7
you choose £7.50 in 20 days, you will receive nothing
today.”
The Hidden reminder condition was identical to the
Hidden zero condition in previous studies, with no
reminders presented. A screenshot in Figure 7 shows
how both reminders were displayed in the Explicit
reminder condition.
Results
Choices. We conducted a 2 (population: Maximiles
versus Prolific Academic) by 2 (LL reminder: present
versus absent) by 2 (SS reminder: present versus
absent) ANOVA. The results, depicted in Figure 8,
were as predicted by the asymmetric subjective oppor-
tunity cost hypothesis. There was only a significant
main effect of the SS reminder (F 4117235 = 15065, p <
000002, 2p = 0002). Moreover, both populations indi-
vidually showed the same pattern of a main effect
of the SS reminder: (Maximiles: F 4113315 = 6043, p =
00012, 2p = 0002; Prolific Academic: F 4113925 = 9057,
p < 00003, 2p = 0002), but neither a main effect of LL
reminder nor an interaction.
Choice Times. As in Study 6, we log-transformed
the choice times for each item before averaging
them, and for descriptive statistics we report the geo-
metric means of these averages. Participants in the
Explicit reminder (Mtime = 502 seconds) and SS re-
minder (Mtime = 501 seconds) conditions took longer
to make their choices than those in the Hidden re-
minder (Mtime = 406 seconds) and LL reminder (Mtime =
409 seconds) conditions. A 2 × 2 ANOVA with SS
reminder and LL reminder predicting log-transformed
choice times confirmed a main effect of SS reminder,
Figure 8 Mean Level of Patience (Proportion of LL Choices), as a
Function of the Reminder Condition, in Study 7
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F 4117255= 301, p = 0001, 2p = 0001, but no significant
effect of LL reminder, F 4117255= 201, p = 0015, and no
interaction, F 4117255 = 101, p = 0030. This again sup-
ports our view that the SS reminder, like the SS zero,
provides people with something to consider (namely,
the opportunity cost of choosing SS), that they would
otherwise neglect. However, while a paired contrast
between the SS reminder and LL reminder choice
times was in the predicted direction, it was not signif-
icant, t43625= 009, p= 0036, d = 001.
In our final study (Study 8), we examine whether
the ASOC effect applies to more realistic (i.e., less
stylized) decision scenarios and to nonmonetary
outcomes.
Study 8
The experiments reported so far focused on relatively
stylized choices between smaller, sooner and larger,
later amounts of money. Similarly, almost all previous
studies of the Hidden zero effect have used stylized
choices of this sort (Magen et al. 2008, 2014; Radu
et al. 2011; Read and Scholten 2012; Wu and He 2012).
The only exception of which we are aware is the sin-
gle study by Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) in which
participants chose between dining options. Yet, in
their everyday lives, people have to consider a much
wider range of intertemporal choices, and trade-offs
between pure sums of money across time may be
neither the most common nor the most consequen-
tial of these choices. Therefore, in Study 8 we exam-
ined whether the asymmetric effects of highlighting
the SS and LL opportunity costs would be observed
in a wider range of choices. We presented partici-
pants with choices between concrete and primarily
nonmonetary SS and LL options. Choices included
saving some lives now or more later, receiving some
chocolate now or more later, purchasing a phone now
or getting a discount later (the sole “monetary” sce-
nario used in this study), having improved air quality
now or later, and so on (see Table 6 for the summary
of the scenarios used). Furthermore, many of these
choice scenarios involved a full paragraph describing
the situation, making them much richer than the sim-
ple monetary scenarios used in our earlier studies. For
all scenarios, we constructed variations corresponding
to the four core frames and then tested the asymmet-
ric subjective opportunity cost hypothesis.
Methods
Participants were 318 undergraduate students (52%
female, mean age = 19.7 years) at the University of
British Columbia and Carnegie Mellon University.
They completed the study in exchange for course
credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of the core frames (Hidden opportunity costs, LL
opportunity cost, SS opportunity cost, or Explicit
opportunity costs) and made choices for all 10 choice
scenarios (summarized in Table 6), which were pre-
sented individually and in random order. Figure 9
shows screen shots from two of these scenarios.
Results
Choices. As in earlier studies, we collapsed across
questions and calculated patience (the proportion
of LL responses) for each participant. Overall, this
showed the ASOC effect: participants chose LL more
often in the Explicit (59%) and SS opportunity cost
(59%) conditions than in the Hidden (49%) or LL
opportunity cost (51%) conditions, F 4113145 = 1202,
p = 00001, 2p = 0004. An SS opportunity cost (present
versus absent) by scenario interaction was found, sug-
gesting that the effect of highlighting the SS oppor-
tunity cost was stronger in some scenarios than in
others, F 4913065= 302, p= 00001, 2p = 0009. Examining
the choice results (summarized in Table 6) for each
of the 10 scenarios individually, the ASOC effect was
significant in six of them (see Table 6). These “success-
ful” scenarios involved human lives, air quality, mass
transit, chocolates, and movie downloads. Out of the
four scenarios where the SS opportunity cost had no
significant effect, three (chocolate truffles, phone dis-
count, and music downloads) may have failed to yield
a reliable pattern because of a ceiling effect due to
a high baseline of LL responses (74% or higher in
the Hidden opportunity costs condition). The fourth
scenario (pollution free days) showed a (nonsignifi-
cant) change in the predicted direction. Other than
differences in baseline LL responses leading to ceil-
ing effects, we do not see any systematic differences
between the scenarios that produced a significant
SS opportunity cost effect and those that did not.
In fact, every scenario that did not produce signifi-
cant effects had a counterpart that did: the Belgian
chocolates, financial gains (as in Studies 1–7), movie
downloads, and air quality scenarios all showed the
predicted effect. This moderating role of item-level
ceiling effects is consistent with our earlier item-level
analyses of the Magen and Kirby items (Table 3),
which revealed that the ASOC effect is systematically
weaker when the proportion of LL choices in the stan-
dard Hidden zero frame already approaches 100%.
Choice Times. As with our previous analyses of
choice times, we analyzed the average natural logged
choice times and report their geometric means. As
expected, participants in the Explicit (Mtime = 1300 sec-
onds) and SS opportunity cost (Mtime = 1202 seconds)
conditions took longer to respond than participants
in the Hidden (Mtime = 1006 seconds) and LL oppor-
tunity cost conditions (Mtime = 1102 seconds). There
was a main effect of SS opportunity cost on choice
time, F 4113145 = 1101, p = 00001, 2p = 0003, no signif-
icant effect of LL opportunity cost, F 4113145 = 109,
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Table 6 Choice Options, Choice Proportions, and p-Values for the 10 Scenarios Used in Study 8
Proportion
Scenario Choice options choosing LL p-values
Lives saved (pollution) 0 0 0The government has to choose between two programs to control this
pollution 0 0 0 Save 100 lives now [but save no lives 25 years from
now] or Save 200 lives 25 years from now [but save no lives now]
Hidden: 0.28
LL zero: 0.36
SS zero: 0.63
Explicit: 0.42
SS zero effect: < 00001
LL zero effect: 0.25
Interaction: < 0001
Chocolate truffles Imagine you are participating in a focus group meeting that will last two
hours 0 0 0 Receive 2 truffles now [but nothing when the focus group
ends] or Receive 3 truffles when the focus group ends [but nothing
now]
Hidden: 0.86
LL zero: 0.71
SS zero: 0.72
Explicit: 0.81
SS zero effect: 0.66
LL zero effect: 0.53
Interaction: 0.02
Phone discount Imagine that you decide to purchase a new phone 0 0 0Receive $34 off
the phone price today [but receive no discount in 30 days] or Receive
$50 off the phone price in 30 days [but receive no discount today]
Hidden: 0.74
LL zero: 0.83
SS zero: 0.70
Explicit: 0.82
SS zero effect: 0.58
LL zero effect: 0.03
Interaction: 0.80
Air quality 0 0 0 Improved air quality immediately for 21 days [but no improved air
quality one year from now] or Improved air quality one year from
now for 25 days [but no improved air quality now]
Hidden: 0.20
LL zero: 0.36
SS zero: 0.42
Explicit: 0.43
SS zero effect: < 0001
LL zero effect: 0.11
Interaction: 0.13
Mass transit 0 0 0 Improved transit service immediately for 60 days [but no improved
transit service one year from now] or Improved transit service one
year from now for 68 days [but no improved transit service now]
Hidden: 0.24
LL zero: 0.38
SS zero: 0.36
Explicit: 0.50
SS zero effect: 0.02
LL zero effect: < 0001
Interaction: 0.99
Belgian chocolates Which would you prefer? Receive a box of 16 fine Belgian chocolates
today [and no chocolates in one year] or Receive a box of 24 fine
Belgian chocolates in one year [and no chocolates today]
Hidden: 0.36
LL zero: 0.30
SS zero: 0.45
Explicit: 0.52
SS zero effect: < 0001
LL zero effect: 0.84
Interaction: 0.22
Music downloads Which would you prefer? Receive 10 free music downloads of your
choice now [and no free downloads in one month] or Receive 15 free
music downloads of your choice in one month [and no free
downloads now]
Hidden: 0.79
LL zero: 0.70
SS zero: 0.77
Explicit: 0.70
SS zero effect: 0.80
LL zero effect: 0.10
Interaction: 0.90
Lives saved (public health) Suppose the government was choosing between two public health
programs to save lives. Which would you prefer? Save 11 lives in
2016 [but save 0 lives in 2017] or Save 13 lives in 2017 [but save 0
lives in 2016]
Hidden: 0.51
LL zero: 0.48
SS zero: 0.65
Explicit: 0.60
SS zero effect: 0.02
LL zero effect: 0.44
Interaction: 0.85
Pollution free days Which would you prefer? 11 extra pollution free days in 2016 [but no
extra pollution free days in 2017] or 13 extra pollution free days in
2017 [but no extra pollution free days in 2016]
Hidden: 0.42
LL zero: 0.42
SS zero: 0.48
Explicit: 0.44
SS zero effect: 0.45
LL zero effect: 0.67
Interaction: 0.74
Movie downloads Which would you prefer? Receive 5 free movie downloads of your
choice now [and no free downloads in one year] or Receive 10 free
movie downloads of your choice in one year [and no free
downloads now]
Hidden: 0.47
LL zero: 0.60
SS zero: 0.69
Explicit: 0.71
SS zero effect: < 0001
LL zero effect: 0.18
Interaction: 0.34
p = 0017, 2p = 0001, and no interaction, F 4113145 =
000, thus paralleling the choice data and replicating
our two previous studies. A paired contrast between
the SS opportunity cost condition and the LL oppor-
tunity cost condition was in the predicted direction
but not significant, t41585 = 103, p = 0019, d = 0021.
Although the time difference here (1.0 seconds) was
larger than in Study 6 (0.6 seconds), the variance was
also larger (2.3 versus 1.7)—because several scenarios
in this study contained a long paragraph of text—so
the difference is less reliable.
In sum, this study demonstrates that SS opportu-
nity cost framing also influences choices between non-
monetary SS and LL options, such as human lives or
mass transit quality.6 Furthermore, our participants
took longer to respond to SS opportunity cost framed
scenarios (but not to the LL opportunity cost framed
scenarios), indicating that the “future nothing” fram-
ing increases the salience of information that people
may not naturally consider, while the “present noth-
ing” framing may be intuitively obvious and therefore
adds nothing new to the decision process.
6 That the choices consist of SS and LL options may be critical. In
two studies not reported here, participants chose between the same
option now versus in the future (e.g., one chocolate now versus
one chocolate in one hour), and these scenarios generally yielded
null results. However, null results are difficult to interpret, and
future research should explicitly compare SS versus LL scenarios
with “same option” scenarios within the same study.
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Figure 9 Screen Shots Showing Two of the Scenarios Presented in Study 8
Discussion
Our central thesis is that intertemporal choice is
driven (among other things) by an asymmetric atten-
tion to opportunity costs. Although people are natu-
rally (and chronically) aware that choosing the larger,
later option means receiving (or incurring) nothing
sooner, they are less attentive to the equally “obvious”
fact that choosing the smaller, sooner option means
missing out on (or avoiding) a larger outcome later
on. Consequently, and as our studies repeatedly show,
while people become more patient when reminded
of the opportunity cost of taking something earlier
instead of later, they are unmoved when reminded
of the opportunity cost of taking something later
rather than earlier. We called this the ASOC (Asym-
metric Subjective Opportunity Cost) effect. It helps
explain the tendency for human decision makers to be
impatient and impulsive (e.g., why they often prefer
smaller, sooner payoffs to larger, later ones that offer
generous interest rates).
Our results are robust to many factors.7 The ASOC
effect occurs with horizontally and vertically presented
7 As with any manipulation of this sort, there are boundary conditions
and moderators that researchers need to keep in mind, such as the
extent to which one option clearly dominates in terms of its payoff(s)
and/or delay(s). Our item-level analyses of the Magen and Kirby
items, as well as those used in Study 8, revealed that the ASOC effect
is typically stronger when baseline LL preferences are closer to 50%
(neither choice option clearly dominates in the standard Hidden zero
frame), and weakens as they approach 100% (LL is already preferred
by most people in the standard Hidden zero frame) or 0% (SS is heav-
ily preferred in the standard Hidden zero frame). The dampening of
the ASOC effect when most people already prefer LLmerely reflects a
ceiling effect. The dampening of the ASOC effect when SS is strongly
preferred is potentially more interesting as it suggests (in line with
our theory) that the impact of subtly reminding people that choosing
SS means forgoing the LL payoff will depend on how much larger
the LL payoff is compared to the SS payoff; clearly, highlighting the
forgone LL payoff will have little or no impact when it is not much
(subjectively) larger than the SS payoff. In sum, if one choice option
clearly dominates (in people’s minds), the ASOC effect is going to
be weaker, as we would expect with such a subtle (and normatively
irrelevant) manipulation.
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choice options (Study 1), with outcomes of varying
magnitude (Study 2), with immediate or delayed SS
options (Study 3), for both gains and losses (Study 4),
with real payoffs (Study 6), and for nonmonetary
outcomes, such as lives saved or luxury chocolates
(Study 8). Moreover, the effect is not restricted to the
“zero” wording: we find the same pattern when the
term “nothing” is substituted for the zero (Study 5)
and when we remind people of the opportunity
cost(s) in another, more explicit way (Study 7). In
addition, we observed it in several different coun-
tries (not only in the United States and the United
Kingdom, but also in India), and with both online and
student samples.
We also found that choice time data were con-
sistent with what we would expect from an effect
driven by asymmetric attention to opportunity costs
(Studies 6–8): Highlighting the SS opportunity cost
increased the time participants spent deciding more
than did highlighting the LL opportunity cost, which
suggests the former (but not the latter) increased
consideration of otherwise neglected information—
namely, the forgone gains (or losses) associated with
choosing SS. Our results also help elucidate the
nature of the cognitive processes underlying the
effect in other ways. For example, Radu et al. (2011,
p. 366) proposed a “temporal attention hypothesis”
to explain the Hidden zero effect, which has some
similarities to our asymmetric subjective opportu-
nity cost hypothesis. Specifically, they posited that
the addition of zeros increases patience by shift-
ing attention away from immediate gratification (i.e.,
focusing away from “now”) and toward more dis-
tant periods in the past or future. According to their
theory, the Hidden zero effect reflects a reduction
in present bias specifically, rather than in delay dis-
counting more generally. Yet we now know (from
Study 3) that the Hidden zero effect occurs even in the
absence of any immediate payoff option. This favors
our asymmetric subjective opportunity cost hypothe-
sis (which does not operate on the present bias param-
eter) over their temporal attention hypothesis (which
does). A second difference between these theories is
that their account places less emphasis on the asym-
metry in salience that we have shown is critical to
the effect. Indeed, they did not directly manipulate
or test the asymmetry of attention to SS versus LL
payoffs (or to their opportunity costs). A third differ-
ence is that their theory seems to focus on how peo-
ple choose between immediate versus future (or past)
gains, and does not generalize to trade-offs between
sooner versus later losses. For example, Radu et al.
(2011) explain (p. 366) that their “temporal atten-
tion hypothesis, suggests that explicit-zero framing
increases patience by emphasizing the unpleasant dis-
tant consequences associated with present respond-
ing.” Yet, when it comes to losses, impatience is
associated with future responding (i.e., delaying a
loss) rather than present responding. Therefore, in
the domain of losses, intertemporal choices and their
underlying cognitive processes do not “demonstrate
[a] bias for immediate over temporally distant out-
comes” (Radu et al. 2011, p. 380). In fact, as our
Study 4 results show, the Explicit (or SS) zero frame
also promotes patience in the loss domain by increas-
ing (not decreasing) preference for the SS option.
In addition to the eight studies reported in this
paper, we ran several that are not reported. Most
were excluded because they were designed as pilot
studies (we had no a priori intention of using their
data), they tested another hypothesis that was unre-
lated to the current paper (e.g., the effect of adding
more than one middle zero), or they contained an
error (e.g., some payoffs were accidentally presented
in the wrong currency). One concern with the exclu-
sion of studies, however, is that experimenters may
do so (even unintentionally) in a selective way that
maximizes the likelihood of obtaining desired results
(Ioannidis et al. 2014, John et al. 2012). In our case,
the concern would be that the ASOC effect might dis-
appear once we reintroduce these studies. To address
this issue, we combined data across all 15 studies
(reported and unreported) in which participants were
exposed to the four core framing conditions with-
out additional manipulations. Specifically, we com-
bined all data from participants exposed to the four
core treatment frames when these only involved mon-
etary gains, and when the sooner option always
occurred today. The resulting sample consisted of N =
51129 individuals. We carried out our standard 2 × 2
ANOVA analysis, with patience as the dependent
variable. The results mirrored our reported findings:
Only the main effect of highlighting the SS oppor-
tunity cost was significant (F 411511255 = 211056, p <
000001, 2p = 0004), whereas there was no effect of
highlighting the LL opportunity cost nor an interac-
tion (both other Fs< 0.5). In fact, if we just consider
the unreported studies (N = 21324) we also obtain
only a main effect of highlighting the SS opportunity
cost: F 411213205 = 63065, p < 000001, 2p = 0003 (both
other Fs< 004). Clearly, the main findings reported in
this paper were not merely the product of selective
reporting.
Table 7 shows the effect of highlighting the SS
opportunity cost for all eight studies reported here,
as well as for the unreported studies (aggregated).
The table shows the mean and confidence intervals
for its impact on patience, its proportional increase in
patience (relative to the standard Hidden frame), and
its effect size (Cohen’s d). We can see that highlight-
ing the SS opportunity cost consistently increased
patience in all studies. By contrast, a similar study-
by-study examination of the impact of highlighting
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Table 7 Summary of Results Obtained Across All Studies, Showing the Increase in Patience
(Increased Proportion of LL Choices) When the SS Opportunity Cost is Highlighted
(Compared to When It Is Not)
Increase in Proportional increase Effect size Sample size
patience [95% CI] (%) in patience (%) d N
Study 1 13 681177 25 0.47 565
Study 2 15 6101207 35 0.70 262
Study 3 28 6211357 69 0.91 281
Study 4 12 681167 17 0.59 326
Study 5 21 6141277 47 0.67 339
Study 6 8 631147 14 0.34 301
Study 7 9 641137 19 0.29 731
Study 8 9 641147 18 0.39 318
Average [total] across 8 studies 14 30 0.54 [3,123]
Additional unreported studies 10 671127 22 0.32 2,324
Note. These comparisons are based on data from the four main framing conditions in each study (i.e., the Middle
zero framing condition is excluded).
the LL opportunity cost showed that this latter effect
was never significant (in any of our reported or unre-
ported studies) and that its direction was inconsis-
tent across studies (ranging from a 7% decrease to
a 3% increase in the proportion of LL choices). Alto-
gether, these results support our strong asymmetry
predictions: there is a reliable and sizeable effect of
highlighting the SS opportunity cost but no effect of
highlighting the LL opportunity cost.
It is also worth noting that the ASOC effect has
now been demonstrated both with Western partici-
pants (our UK and U.S. samples) and East Asian par-
ticipants (college students in China—see Wu and He
2012). Moreover, in two of our unreported studies
we collected data from M-Turk participants in India
(N = 152). It turns out these South Asian participants
show a strong SS zero effect (F 4111485 = 46015, p <
000001, 2p = 0024), but no LL zero effect nor an inter-
action (both ps > 003). This suggests the asymmetric
attention paid to opportunity costs in intertemporal
choices may be a general human tendency rather than
the product of (a particular) culture.
Of course, individuals (e.g., Nenkov et al. 2008,
Strathman et al. 1994) and societies (e.g., Noguchi et al.
2014, Preis et al. 2012) vary in how frequently and
intensely they focus on future consequences. Suscep-
tibility to the effect of highlighting the SS opportu-
nity cost should depend on an individual’s baseline
tendency to consider future opportunity costs (i.e.,
in the absence of explicit reminders). Our theoreti-
cal framework also predicts that individuals who are
naturally attentive to future opportunity costs will be
less affected by (or even immune to) manipulations
that highlight the SS opportunity cost (in the same
way that chronic awareness of immediate opportunity
costs makes people unmoved by efforts to highlight
the LL opportunity cost). In fact, Wu and He (2012)
reported that individuals naturally inclined to focus
on the future, or to consider future consequences, are
much less affected by the Explicit zero and SS zero
frames. The theoretical account laid out in this paper
can, thus, accommodate existing evidence concern-
ing the moderating effect of individual differences in
future orientation.
While our studies have repeatedly demonstrated an
asymmetry in the way people respond to manipula-
tions that highlight intertemporal opportunity costs,
the precise cause(s) of this ASOC effect remains a
topic for future research. In particular, it is not clear
whether the ASOC effect is due to changes in aware-
ness of the SS opportunity cost (as we emphasize in
this paper), changes in evaluations of the SS oppor-
tunity cost (e.g., perhaps people are naturally aware
of it, but highlighting it makes them care more
about it), or both (see Bartels and Urminsky 2015).
The choice time data we reported suggest that the
SS zero (or SS nothing reminder) makes informa-
tion more salient to decision makers, which supports
the awareness account. However, changes in evalua-
tion could create or amplify choice conflict, which
would also increase choice times. In this paper, we
have emphasized the awareness account, because it
more parsimoniously explains the choice time results.
Furthermore, we have ruled out a number of alter-
nate theories, including accounts based on sequence-
preferences (see also Radu et al. 2011), numerical
contrasts, averaging, and similarity.
Theoretical Links and Policy Applications
A variety of theories, models, and mechanisms have
been proposed to explain why human decision mak-
ers discount future outcomes and, in particular, why
we tend to be so impatient (e.g., Doyle 2013, Freder-
ick et al. 2002, Read 2004, Soman et al. 2005, Urmin-
sky and Zauberman 2014). Yet, to the best of our
knowledge, none of these accounts have incorpo-
rated the mechanism examined in this paper: an
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asymmetric attention to the opportunity costs asso-
ciated with choosing sooner versus later outcomes.
Our paper, therefore, contributes significantly to our
understanding of intertemporal choice by identifying
(and demonstrating the importance of) this previously
overlooked mechanism. While we do not claim that
asymmetric attention to opportunity costs explains all
of the variance in intertemporal decision making, we
believe it contributes a substantial portion of it, and
therefore deserves greater attention from researchers.
Our results and the theoretical account we pro-
pose can be understood by looking at a distinction
already familiar to early economists. In addition to
core economic determinants of intertemporal pref-
erences, such as interest rates and liquidity con-
straints, they also pointed to the effects of moti-
vational and cognitive factors. Motivational factors
include the “pure rate of time preference,” or the dif-
ferent value placed on consumption as a function of
it being delayed, with impatience reflecting a pref-
erence to receive a given level of consumption as
early as possible.8 Cognitive factors comprise the way
those outcomes are conceptualized, with impatience
reflecting a change in representation due to delay.
Böhm-Bawerk (1890), for instance, proposed that dis-
tant outcomes are devalued partly because they are
hard to imagine, so that when deciding between
present and future there is an asymmetry between
now and later:
Provision for the future makes no inconsiderable de-
mands on our intellectual strength; makes some de-
mands, even, on our moral strength; and these
demands are not equally met by men at all stages of
civilization. The present always gets its rights. It forces
itself upon us through our senses. To cry for food when
hungry occurs even to a baby. But the future we must
anticipate and picture. (p. 244, italics added)
Similar views have been aired by many others (e.g.,
Akerlof 1991, Fisher 1930) and have a modern par-
allel in theoretical approaches built on the concept
of psychological distance (Pronin et al. 2008, Trope
and Liberman 2010). Pronin et al. (2008), for example,
demonstrated that the experiences and desires of our
present self (the person we are now) are more accessi-
ble and naturally salient to us than those of our future
self (the person we expect to be in the future), leading
us to neglect the latter. They showed that manipu-
lations designed to increase attention to the feelings
and desires of the future self, or to reduce attention
to the feelings and desires of the present self, led peo-
ple to discount the future self less. Their results and
8 The pure rate is separate from factors such as changes in the
ability to enjoy consumption, or risk, or inflation, or increasing
wealth—all of which can influence preferences for future over cur-
rent consumption.
the theoretical account they proposed thus dovetail
with the ones in this paper. These accounts would
suggest there is no need for an LL zero (or LL nothing
reminder) to focus people on the opportunity costs
of choosing delayed gains (or immediate losses), but
there is a need for an SS zero (or SS nothing reminder)
to focus them on the opportunity costs of choosing
immediate gains (or delayed losses). In fact, we found
the SS zero effect emerges even when SS is delayed,
suggesting that it is often the earliest available option
that gets its “rights,” and not just options available
immediately—a view consistent with recent neuro-
scientific evidence (Glimcher et al. 2007, Kable and
Glimcher 2010).
The reliability and robustness of the ASOC effect
suggests it can be used as a cheap but effective
policy nudge: simply making future opportunity
costs explicit will nudge people toward more patient
choices. It is likely that for many intertemporal choices
the delayed consequences of decisions are given little
attention and possibly even none at all. How many
people, for instance, when considering the purchase
of a large TV, think about the consequences that pur-
chase will have during their retirement, when their
pension pot is reduced by several thousand dollars?
Reminding them of those consequences (by highlight-
ing the SS opportunity cost) is likely to make them
at least more equivocal about the decision. Indeed,
recent experimental evidence from the field supports
the beneficial effects of reminders on savings behav-
iors (Karlan et al. 2016).
We end our discussion by placing what we have
learned in a more formal context, showing how the
ASOC effect can inform the modeling of intertempo-
ral choice.
A (Slightly More) Formal Analysis
The standard delay discounting account of intertem-
poral choice proposes the choice between SS and LL is
determined by weighing the discounted value of the
sooner outcome (xS5, against the discounted value of
the later one (xL5. For reasons that will become appar-
ent, we call this account the “Neutral perspective”
and summarize it as follows:
Neutral perspective: SS¼≺LL1 if v4xS5Ò v4xL51
where v4 · 5 depicts the value of the SS and LL out-
comes, and the right-hand side shows how the value
of xL is weighted by a discount factor  ≤ 1, which
represents the impact of the interval separating the
two options (or the ASAP effect, see Study 3 in this
paper, and Scholten and Read 2006). The expression
denotes that SS will be preferred to LL if the value of
xS exceeds the discounted value of xL. Note that v4xS5
shows no relative discounting, even if delayed, since
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the interval preceding it is common to both outcomes
and so cancels out.
While we have not tested a formal model of in-
tertemporal choice, we will briefly sketch out the
elements needed to accommodate the ASOC effect.
We suggest that when making any choice, a person
can look at the options from multiple perspectives,
and her resulting decision will reflect an aggrega-
tion of those different perspectives. Framing changes
how attention is distributed over these perspectives,
and perhaps the total amount of attention allocated
as well. One perspective is the neutral frame given
above, but alternatives include treating one option
(either the sooner or later one) as a reference point,
from which the other option deviates. When the
sooner option (SS) is the reference point, for instance,
we would have:
SS reference point perspective:
SS¼≺LL1 if v4xS5Ò v4xL5−v4xS51
where the addition of 6−v4xS57 to the right-hand side
of the inequality denotes that, in this representation,
not receiving xS at tS is viewed as incurring a loss
(when  > 0), which reduces the attractiveness of LL.
The SS reference point is the perspective most nat-
urally facilitated by highlighting the LL opportunity
cost. Similarly, if the later option (LL) is taken as a
reference point then SS is disadvantaged as follows:
LL reference point perspective:
SS¼≺LL1 if v4xS5−v4xL5Ò v4xL50
Here, the addition of 6−v4xL57 to the left-hand
side of the inequality quantifies the (time discounted)
reduction in attractiveness of SS when not receiv-
ing xL at tL is viewed as incurring a loss (i.e., for val-
ues of  > 0). This LL reference point perspective is
the one most naturally facilitated by highlighting the
SS opportunity cost. This proposal is similar to an ear-
lier one by Loewenstein (1988) as an account of the
delay-speedup asymmetry.
All three perspectives can emerge from any option
description, and it is likely that they all play a role
regardless of the frame chosen. If we denote the rela-
tive attention paid to each reference point perspective
by the parameters aS and aL, which are normalized
relative to the attention paid to the Neutral perspec-
tive,9 then the choice between SS and LL can be con-
ceptualized as a weighted average of the arguments
provided by the three separate perspectives:
9 This normalization assigns aN = 1 to attention paid to the neutral
frame, with total attention then given as 1 + aS + aL. An alternative
is to define total attention as unity and define aN = 1 − aS − aL,
which can simplify matters. However, our results suggest that total
attention paid to the task varies from frame to frame, with more
attention paid to the task when the SS opportunity cost is made
explicit.
All three perspectives (nested):
SS¼≺LL1 if v4xS5− aLv4xL5Ò v4xL5− aSv4xs51
∴ if 41 + aS5v4xS5Ò 41 + aL5v4xL50
The impacts of highlighting the LL and SS oppor-
tunity costs are reflected in the attention parameters
aS and aL, respectively. Our results suggest an asym-
metric pattern, whereby aS is unchanged by highlight-
ing the LL opportunity cost and aL is increased by
highlighting the SS opportunity cost. This interpre-
tation is also consistent with our choice time data
in Studies 6–8. When a reminder of the SS opportu-
nity cost was added, more time was spent deciding.
By contrast, adding a reminder of the LL opportu-
nity cost had a much smaller (or no) impact on choice
times. This suggests the cognitive processing of the
options changes, even if only quantitatively, when
the SS reminder is added. We suggest the additional
choice time represents extra time spent considering
the opportunity cost of choosing the SS option. That
is, the extra processing time is due to an increase
in aL—the attention given to the choice construal that
makes LL the reference point.
Conclusion
People are often impatient, choosing smaller, sooner
rewards. Our results suggest this may occur in (large)
part because they do not give due weight to the future
opportunity costs of these impatient choices (e.g., get-
ting nothing later). Fortunately, when these oppor-
tunity costs are highlighted, people take notice and
choose larger, later rewards more frequently, across a
wide variety of situations (magnitudes, delays, gains
and losses, real and hypothetical, monetary and non-
monetary). Therefore, it seems the salient prospect of
a future nothing may hold some value for improving
decision making in the present.
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